We analyze the characteristics of new businesses in the German ICT industry distinguished by their choice between two IPR-regimes: open source software (OSS) versus closed source software (CSS). The share of new firms with an OSS-based business model has considerably increased over the last years. OSS-based firms tend to be smaller (in terms of staff and capital) and experience less shortages of capital. OSS business models seem to be established nowadays, as only in older cohorts OSS-intensive start-ups have larger problems to convince potential financiers to invest than their CSS counterparts. We find no indication that the lower entry barriers for OSS firms are particularly attractive for start-ups with low human capital endowment or to necessitymotivated entrepreneurs.
Introduction
Institutions affect start-up activities and entrepreneurship in many ways (see Acs et al., 2008; Foss and Foss, 2006; Henrekson and Sanandaji, 2010; Bosma, Fritsch and Schroeter, 2010, for an overview). Typically, institutions differ among regions, countries or sectors, thus research has to compare regions or countries (Amoros, 2009; Burke and Fraser, 2007; Hall and Sobel, 2008; Nyström, 2008) . A more direct comparative research is possible only if firms from the same country and sector can choose different institutional (sub-)settings. The ICT sector offers such an opportunity, as here firms can choose between two different, software-related IPR regimes: firms with
business models based open source software (OSS) versus closed source software (CSS) act not only in the same sector but often directly compete in the same market. This paper analyses the effects of OSS versus CSS based business models on new business formation in the ICT sector.
In many cases, today's product quality depends sensitively on the software it contains. This is particularly true for the ICT sector where most goods and services are based on and/or are determined by software, which can be OSS or CSS, the latter also called 'proprietary' software. CSS is based on the idea of exclusive intellectual property, protected by the restrictive CSS-licenses. Consequently, the usercustomer receives CSS in form of a binary code and has no access to the source code -the human-readable recipe of a software program. 2 OSS, on the opposite, is marked by free access to the source code and is developed in a public, collaborative manner. The principle of openness is codified in the OSS licenses, which permit users to apply, change and redistribute the software. This "new intellectual property 2 When writing a software program, the programmer writes this in a programming language. The result is the human readable source code. To run a software program on a computer this code must be transformed to the (only machine readable) binary code. Giving away the binary code only, keeps the information of the source code secret and also prohibits changes in the program itself (To change a program a programmer would need to implement the new tasks in the (source) code itself.) paradigm" (Maurer and Scotchmer, 2006) , implies different allocations of IPRs and different modes of organization as compared to CSS. High quality OSS products such as Linux, Apache etc. are developed by thousands of volunteers, who often do not receive direct monetary reward. In addition, more and more profit-seeking firms are engaged in the OSS community. Small and medium sized enterprises as well as large companies use OSS-based business models. Such business models are based on selling complementary products. These complements can be hardware like servers or cell phones, premium versions of the software, or different kinds of service like maintenance. 3 So far, research on the effects of OSS-based business models on the firms' performance and properties has mainly focused on OSS firms only. The majority of literature describes various business models of OSS-firms, why and how they are engaged in the OSS community and whether such community-participation has an impact on their performance (see, among others, Bonaccorsi et al., 2006; Dahlander & Magnusson, 2006; Dahlander & Wallin, 2006; Fosfuri et al., 2008; Harison & Cowan, 2004; , Stam, 2009 and West & Gallagher 2006 . The relationship between OSS and entrepreneurship is analyzed by Gruber and Henkel (2006) OSS strategies, and firms that are younger and smaller more often apply OSS supply strategies. Software firms owned by one or two individuals or a family tend to be CSS-only. Finally the magnitude of the service variety provided by the firms has a positive impact on the propensity to adopt OSS strategies.
Our paper analyzes which aspects shape the institutional choice (OSS-versus CSS-based business models) of German ICT start-ups.
We distinguish different levels of OSS-intensity (ranging from never OSS to always OSS) in the different business fields of the ICT start-ups, ranging form hardware and software to web-related services. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 first explains the principle institutional differences of OSS and CSS. Section 3 gives an overview on the relationship between institutions and entrepreneurship based on a conceptual model. We then develop in section 4 our hypotheses about the connection between the characteristics of new businesses and their decisions to use OSS-or CSS-based business models. Section 5 introduces the data and section 6 reports the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, we discuss our findings and draw conclusions for further research (section 7).
OSS versus CSS: A difference in institutions
Institutions shape human interaction as they define the incentive structure. North (1994) distinguishes between formal institutions like rules, laws, constitutions etc. and informal institutions like norms of behavior, conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct etc. The difference between OSS and CSS is a difference in institutions. CSS and OSS are different kinds of "institutional arrangements" (Davis and North, 1971) , distinguishable by their distinct use of copyright law that is codified in the software licenses. The different types of licenses lead to different allocations of IPRs and different governance structures regarding the software development process (see Engelhardt, 2008 , for a more detailed exposition). Figure 1 depicts the institutional differences between OSS and CSS: 
Allocation of IPRs
Firms vs. community-projects source code is an asset for the developing firm. In contrast, OSS is based on inclusive ownership codified in the inclusive OSS licenses: the OSS licenses transfer the usus, usus fructus and also the abusus rights. Therefore OSS is marked by free access to the source code in order to enable users to change and further develop the code. Nevertheless, OSS is not software without any property. The different OSS licenses are based upon copyright law, and many licenses contain restrictions to ensure that OSS cannot be turned into CSS. For example the most popular type of OSS-license, GPL, states that any further developed software as well any derived code must also be licensed as a whole under the GPL. Hence, firms cannot use OSS code as an exclusive asset, and one cannot separate producers from users via IPRallocation. Thus, OSS is typically developed by community-based projects. Such projects are clearly structured but open and permeable.
OSS projects are governed by a mix of formal and informal institutions. This implies, for example, that firms with OSS-based business models have to act compliant with the community rules, otherwise they risk that cooperation is stopped etc. (Osterloh et al., 2001, 16 f) .
Institutions and Entrepreneurship
The relationship between institutions and entrepreneurship can be explained on the basis of a conceptual model (figure 2). The starting point of this conceptual model entails the feasible entrepreneurial opportunities, i.e. existing chances that are in principle accessible for everyone (for a more detailed exposition see Bosma, Fritsch and Schroeter, 2010) . The available entrepreneurial opportunities are in many respects shaped by the governing formal and informal institutions. 4 Examples of how formal institutions shape the 4 There is a pronounced interdependence between the formal and the informal institutions. The formal institutions have often emerged from the informal institutions. However, the governing formal institutions feed back to the informal institutions by providing the legal framework for interaction that may lead to the further development of formal rules. The emergence of OSS is a good example for such a development. OSS emerged from the dissatisfaction with the closed source principle. Based on the informal institutions of hacker ethics and a culture of making software freely available, MIT-scientist Richard Stallman designed and introduced the GNU General Public entrepreneurial opportunities are the formal requirements that have to be fulfilled before legally starting a business, or labor market regulations. Informal institutions like certain modes of conduct, routines, or even culture (Freytag and Thurik, 2010; Nguyen et al., 2009) , also determine (the perception of) entrepreneurial opportunities. The differences of OSS and CSS with respect to formal (e.g. licenses) and
informal (e.g. the hacker ethics) institutions thus determine differences in the entrepreneurial opportunity of OSS-versus CSS-based business models. The licenses and the resulting IPR allocation determine the availability of code, and how this code can be used. For example, an
OSS-based business model can be more flexible as the start-up firm has access to the source code and can thus change the given code (e.g. customize) 5 Furthermore, the informal institutions of the OSS community, for example the culture of helping each other but also the notion of `contributing back' (expected reciprocity), shape the entrepreneurial opportunity.
Because the informal institutions, the unwritten rules, emerge through the networks of interactions and face-to-face contact, these networks can be regarded as part of the informal institutions. The overlap between networks and informal institutions is particularly due to the fact that certain rules or a certain 'culture' may be specific to a certain network and do not pertain to other networks, like the example of the OSS hacker ethics shows. (Knight, 1921; Lucas, 1978; Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979; Holmes and Schmitz, 1990) , potential entrepreneurs compare the (pecuniary and non-pecuniary) benefits that they anticipate to earn through employment with those they expect to accrue from starting a business. The independent of resource requirements? Regarding capital we can control for this issue to some degree based on information whether a lack of capital was one of the main problems when starting the business. If we find that OSS founders have indeed experienced stronger capital bottlenecks than founders of CSS-based firms this can be regarded an indication that lower capital requirements of an OSSbased concept may have been the reason to favor this type of strategy.
If capital bottlenecks play no special role for OSS founders, then the smallness of OSS start-ups may be regarded more a result than a reason to choose OSS. We will assume the latter, as anecdotal evidence indicates that OSS facilitates new entrepreneurial opportunities and/or it's recognition. Therefore we expect that H II: OSS-intensive start-ups less often have the problem of a lack of own capital than CSS-based new businesses.
One characteristic of OSS-start-ups in the ICT sector could be having more problems to convince potential financiers. Basically there are two reasons why OSS-based founders may face special problems in this respect. First, there might be a lack of acceptance because OSSbusiness models as such are relatively new and may be regarded more skeptically by potential investors than the more conventional CSSbased concepts. Moreover, financiers might expect that potential customers will only hardly accept OSS-based solutions. Second, financiers might assess OSS-based start-ups more risky since the OSScode as such is public and can, therefore, hardly be sold. Thus, the economic success of OSS start-ups relies more on complementary products and services than is the case for CSS start-ups. Moreover, OSS-based firms depend on the respective software community. Firms have to act compliant with the informal rules of the community otherwise they will be cut off further cooperation. Generally, the future of an OSS-based business models depends on the future of the collaboratively developed OSS project. It may be split up (forking) or even die out because of lack of further voluntary contributions. In other words: The differences in (formal and informal) institutions of OSS versus CSS determine differences in the entrepreneurial opportunity of OSS-based business models. Potential financiers, who have a different opportunity cost filter than the entrepreneurs, may thus valuate the OSS business models lower than CSS-based ones. For these reasons, we expect that H III: OSS-based start-ups have more problems of convincing potential financiers than CSS-based new businesses.
As already mentioned above, OSS vs. CSS affects the opportunity cost filter as it lowers the barriers to entry in terms of individual resources needed. But relatively low entry barriers for OSS-based businesses may attract mainly start-ups with relatively poor quality in terms of qualification and experience which would be hardly able to set up a CSS-based firm (Fritsch and Schroeter, 2009; Parker, 2009 ). This does in no way mean that all OSS-start-ups are of low quality, but low quality start-ups are more likely to be OSS-start-ups than be based on CSS. With regard to the qualification of the personnel one may, therefore, expect that OSS start-ups with less experienced founders and less educated staff to have a higher level of OSS-intensity.
H IV: Founders and personnel of OSS-based start-ups have lower levels of qualification and experience than CSS-based new businesses.
Please note that Hypothesis IV is not contradictory to Harison & Koski (2010) Due to the lower entry barriers for OSS-based firms we expect that H V: Founders of OSS firms are more likely to be necessity motivated than persons which set-up CSS-based firms.
OSS-based businesses have lowers barriers to entry, what makes it
relatively easy to realize a business idea (opportunity) as well as to establish a firm out of necessity. The reason to expect more necessitymotivated founders among the OSS firms is that opportunity-based start-ups are more likely to enter also in fields with relatively high entry barriers.
Data

The survey
Our data is based on a survey among founders of ICT firms in Germany conducted in Fall 2009. In a first step we sent out a postal invitation letter to about 6,000 firms 6 asking to participate in an online-inquiry con-6 The addresses of the ICT firms have been selected from the heise IT-Markt, which is an online catalogue for German ICT firms run by the heise publishing company. Among other products heise publishes the periodical c't, a highly reputated IT-journal as well as the German version of MIT's Technology Review. The homepage of heise is a well known web-adress for ICT issues, and with the heise news ticker the company runs one of the most successful (German) ICT news portals. The heise IT-Markt offers German ICT firms the opportunity include their profile, i.e. their name, address, product-portfolio etc., into a freely available internet-data base. Potential customers can search for ICT firms in this data base using different search parameters (region, products, etc.) . Such a platform is a unique opportunity for being taining an individual access key. After about two weeks we sent out reminder. As a result, more than 700 founders of ICT firms filled out our online-survey completely. As some of those firms did not sufficiently match the focus of our research we finally ended up with a dataset of usable answers of 680 founders which makes a response rate of more than 11 percent.
The survey raised some general information about the firm (e.g., number of employees, date of start-up, problems at start-up etc.) as well as about the use of OSS and CSS. The questions focused particularly on OSS-vs. CSS-based business models, thus tried to investigate in how far OSS is part of the end-product that is sold to the customers (OSS-business model). This does not included aspects like the use of freely available software such as OpenOffice for business correspondence etc. Participants in the survey were asked to select their activities from a predefined set of business fields. If a firm was active in more than three such business fields we asked to select the three most important ones in terms of revenue. Specific questions where then asked for each of these fields. The firm-founders were also asked to select those up to three business fields they were active in when founding the firm. For each of these business fields at the time of start-up we then asked for the usage of OSS 7 . Table 4 in the Appendix gives an overview of the information we use in the paper at hand.
Data reflecting the Institutional change by institutional choice
Over the years, more and more firms got engaged in OSS business.
This institutional change in the ICT sector, induced by institutional choice (OSS-versus CSS-based business models), is also reflected in our data. In Figure 4 the reader can see the shift in the institutional recognized by customers, especially for small and medium sized firms. Starting by the end of March 2009, we collected names and postal addresses of firms operating in the industry sub-categories which were of interest for the purpose of this study. After cleaning the data from duplicates and misleading entries we ended up with addresses of 15,300 firms. From this database we drew a random sample of 6,000 firms. 6
Results of ordered probit analyses: who chooses OSS?
We want to explain the OSS-intensity in the different business fields by the individual characteristics of the respective start-up firms. As the dependend variable is of ordinal character -ranging from always OSS (value = 4) to never OSS (value = 0) -we applied ordered logit analyses (see Greene, 2008, for details) . In order to avoid a survivor bias we As we perform ordered logit regressions we have to test for the parallel regression (proportional odds) assumption. Therefore we do the brant test for each of our models. Furthermore, we include two control variables for the business fields. In the tables represented in this paper, we make use of two aggregated business field dummies: "further dev.
software" and "new media & internet". The first dummy has a value of 1 if the founder has reported that software, further-developed by the startup firm itself, was used in the business field. 11 The latter dummy is 1 if "web hosting", "web design and web service", or "services of new media agencies and related" was the start-up business field. We also run all ordered logit regression models with the complete set of detailed business field dummies (see the appendix for the list of dummies). The results are very similar, but the brant test can not be computed, as the 9 We are indebted to the Centre of European Economic Research for providing these data. 10 The two periods overlap by one year in order to have a sufficient number of observations available 11 This implies that either "selling own hardware with further-developed software", "selling third-party hardware with further-developed software", or "selling furtherdeveloped software" was a start-up business field. The term further-developed implies here that the software was further-developed by the respective start-up firm, not by a third-party. disaggregated business field dummies can not be retained in all binary logits.
In all groups of start-up cohorts -except the two most recent ones (period 2005 -2008 , Table 1, and 2005 -2007, The results for the more recent cohorts (period 2005 -2008 , Table 1) that should not be strongly affected by a survivor-bias clearly indicate that OSS-based start-ups tend to be smaller in terms of personnel and in terms of capital invested. Accordingly, OSS start-ups are to a lesser degree constrained by the availability of capital: in the 2005 -2008 cohorts they do not face special problems in convincing investors. In one model each, the founders of OSS firms have an on average higher qualification level and more experience than those who start a firm based on CSS. We cannot find any statistically significant evidence that OSS start-ups are more motivated by necessity than CSS-based new firms. The brant test indicates that only the models (7) and (8) are problematic.
The highly significant aggregated business field dummy "new media (see footnote 4). Therefore, we also run the ordered logit regressions without the new media & internet group. The results remain quite robust: size in terms of staff and capital as well as lack of own capital are still significantly and negatively correlated with the OSS intensity. 12 We also check whether there is a bias because of a "hardware effect", meaning that firms selling hardware have a significant different affection towards OSS than the software firms. As hardware firms may also systematically differ with respect to the tested firms properties, this could lead to distorted results. Therefore, we use as alternative business field control a hardware/software dummy in the regressions without the new media and internet start ups. However, this was never sig- With regard to our hypotheses we can conclude that the results of our analyses support hypothesis I, stating that smaller start-ups -in terms of staff and capital -are more likely to be OSS-intensive than larger ones. According to hypothesis II we find that OSS-intensive startups report a lesser degree of capital shortages. This may be regarded an indication that OSS-based start-ups do not use OSS because they can not afford CSS. In that sense OSS is in most cases not a strategy of the weak, but provides new entrepreneurial opportunities. A statistically significant relationship between problems of convincing potential financiers and OSS-intensity of the business concept (hypothesis III) can only be found for the [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] cohorts. This suggests that the problems of convincing were driven by a lack of acceptance due to the relative newness of OSS business models in the older cohorts. In other words: if the problems of convincing are mainly caused by the fact that financiers assess OSS-based start-ups more risky, then "convincing financiers" would have to be significant also in the latest cohorts. If our indicators for experience and education are statistically significant they assume a positive sign so that hypothesis IV, stating that founders of OSS firms have lower levels of education and experience has to be rejected. According to our data, OSS seems to rather attract relatively highly qualified entrepreneurs than low quality ones. We find no evidence that OSS is particularly attractive for necessity-based start-ups (hypothesis V).
Summary and outlook
We find evidence that OSS-based business models enable firms to be smaller in terms of staff and capital so that they tend to experience capital shortages to a lesser degree than new businesses based on CSS.
The possible disadvantage with regard to convincing potential financiers to invest into the firm vanishes over time: in the latest cohorts there is no longer any significant effect. Furthermore, the rising share of OSSintensive start-ups over time indicates that this type of business concept is an attractive option for entrepreneurs. In this context it is important to notice that OSS does not represent a special attraction to relatively lowqualified entrepreneurs or to entrepreneurs who start a firm primarily out of necessity. We even find some evidence that founders of OSS-based businesses have a relatively high level of both, experience and education.
This results show a clear effect of institutions, here: the IPR regime, on the characteristics of market entry. This effect is of a rather complex nature. Obviously, simple hypotheses based on the lower individual resources that are needed for an OSS entry tell, at best, only a small part of the story. Further work should try to study these effects in more detail. It would be particularly interesting to learn more about the business models of OSS start-ups and how they differ from those of CSS firms. Since many start-ups are based on elements of OSS and of CSS it would be interesting to know more about the dynamics of this coexistence at the firm level. Do firms that start with a high share of OSS over time switch to more CSS? Do mainly CSS-based firms tend to increase their share of OSS? What makes these types of business models successful? How does the emergence of OSS firms affect the innovative performance of markets? Does the voluntary division of labor in the OSS community drive innovation processes? If yes, what kind of innovation, mostly incremental innovation, mostly radical innovation, or both? These are important questions for further research in the field.
